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Abstract
The Dodd-Frank Act will eliminate the requirement that credit products must be rated be-
fore they can be sold to banks and pension funds. Supporters argue that if the information
in ratings is valuable, issuers or investors will choose to buy the information, even without the
requirement. But free-rider problems abound: investors might not buy ratings because asset
prices partially reveal what others know and asset issuers might not pay for ratings if they
believe investors will buy them anyway. This paper studies how removing ratings requirements
aects provision of nancial information, asset prices and welfare. It describes conditions under
which de-regulated information markets could collapse. But it explains why, when an informa-
tion market collapses, neither asset issuers nor investors prefer mandatory ratings. Furthermore,
a calibration exercise suggests that information market collapse is unlikely. Instead, the repeal
of ratings mandates will simply shift the cost of information production from asset issuers to
investors.
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In July 2010, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Act. One of the features of the act was its
mandate for the SEC to remove ratings requirements for many credit products within a few years.
Currently, some investors (pension funds for example) can only purchase credit products that
achieve a minimum level of credit-worthiness, as determined by a nationally-recognized ratings
agency. Eliminating such requirements would remove a major incentive for issuers of credit products
to obtain ratings, allowing them to decide for themselves whether or not to pay a ratings agency to
rate their asset. If such a rating is not provided by the asset issuer, investors themselves might want
to purchase a rating, or some equivalent summary statistic about the quality of a credit product
that they consider buying. This paper examines the eect of such a policy change on information
provision, credit asset prices, the allocation of productive capital, and welfare. In doing so, it
provides guidance about the wisdom of mandatory certication in many contexts.
The Dodd-Frank Act abolishes ratings requirements. The question this policy raises is not
whether one ought to tinker with the ratings system in order to ameliorate a conict of interest,
but instead whether ratings should be required at all. Therefore, we abstract from the potential
biases or conicts of interest in the ratings process and simply model ratings as noisy signals about
the future value of a risky asset. If the result is that, even if the ratings system functions perfectly,
ratings should not be required, then that is a strong result. If the result is that ratings should be
required, then it suggests that trying to mitigate the conicts of interest is a worthwhile endeavor.
In our model, competitive rating agencies produce unbiased signals, at a cost. Agencies can
either sell the rating service to the issuer, and disclose the rating free of charge to all investors, or
can sell the rating to each investor individually. In this latter case, they must take into account that
investors can free-ride by using equilibrium asset prices to partially infer what others have learned.
Section 2 derives conditions under which an unregulated market for information will follow one
business model or the other, or not exist at all.
Signals aect asset prices in two ways: First, a positive signal will push the price of the asset
up, while a lower-than-expected signal will reduce the price investors are willing to pay for an asset.
In expectation, signals are neutral. The second eect is that the rating makes the asset's payo less
uncertain. In doing so, it makes the asset less risky. Lowering risk lowers the equilibrium return
and systematically raises the asset's price.
Given that information raises asset prices by lowering risk, the question of which assets would
be most aected by the repeal of ratings requirements would appear to be straightforward: the
assets for which the ratings convey the most information or those which investors have the least
prior information about. Section 3 shows that this intuition is incorrect. When prior beliefs are
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very uncertain or signals are very informative, either asset issuers or investors will opt to purchase
information, even without regulatory incentives. Conversely, when signals are uninformative or
prior beliefs are very precise, ratings will indeed disappear but their disappearance has little price
impact. Thus, the assets mostly likely to be aected by the policy change are neither the highest-
nor the lowest-information securities, but the ones in between.
We also investigate whether the repeal of ratings requirements would have a greater eect on
assets with a smaller or larger investor base. Again, we nd that assets in the middle are most
aected, but the reason is dierent. When the investor base is large, each investor needs to bear
only a small amount of risk, so prices are close to expected values regardless of whether ratings are
provided. Conversely, when the investor base is small, each investor must hold many shares of the
asset, in order for the market to clear. Since they are bearing lots of risk from this asset, the price
they are willing to pay for the asset is very sensitive to changes in risk. Since providing information
reduces the risk the asset poses to an informed investor, the incentive for an asset issuer to acquire
a rating and provide it to all investors is high because providing that rating will greatly increase
the price the asset sells for. Thus, for assets with medium-sized investor bases, the Dodd-Frank
reform may reduce their average price, as information becomes more scarce.
One potential reason to regulate nancial information provision is because nancial markets
should facilitate ecient real investment decisions. We model this eect in the following way. At
time 1, an entrepreneur can choose how much to invest. His payo depends on the price the asset
sells for in the time-2 nancial market. If nancial asset prices are very sensitive to changes in the
value of the capital stock (they are informationally ecient), then the entrepreneur has incentives
to invest the optimal amount. This force points towards a social benet of providing information.
The eciency benets of information provision do not imply that requiring ratings is always
good policy. Regulation might result in information over-provision in situations where the social
benet is less than the cost. Conversely, since information externalities invalidate the welfare theo-
rems, the information market also might not get the tradeo right. To understand the relationship
between information and welfare, we compare investors' and issuers' expected utilities with and
without the mandate, both theoretically and numerically.
Our theoretical welfare results (section 4) suggest that, in many cases, neither asset issuers nor
investors prefer ratings requirements. Asset issuers can always choose to purchase and disclose
ratings. Whenever they choose not to purchase a rating, they are better o without the rating, and
otherwise they are indierent. Surprisingly, even though mandatory ratings produce more ecient
capital investment and a higher expected asset payo, and even though the asset issuer pays for
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the ratings, investors typically prefer not to have ratings. Of course, the risk-averse investors like
the fact that ratings make assets less risky. But less risk also implies a lower expected equilibrium
asset return. The net eect is to make investors worse o. They prefer not to have a low-risk,
low-return security, which in the limit, becomes redundant with the risk-free asset they already
have access to. Each investor individually prefers more information. But all investors are better
o when everyone is less informed. Thus, when the market for ratings collapses, investors benet.
Ironically, investors prefer for asset issuers to provide ratings when ratings are cheap. When the
cost of discovering ratings information is low, many investors will buy the information. The result
will either be severe asymmetric information or full information. If a large fraction of investors
become informed and few others remain uninformed, there is a severe asymmetric information
problem that results in welfare losses. If all investors choose to purchase information on their own,
then the situation is identical to one with a ratings mandate, except that the cost of the rating
is borne by investors instead of by the issuer. In both cases, investors can benet from ratings
mandates.
The recent public debate on ratings policy suggests that ratings are costly and not very infor-
mative. Section 5 uses data on ratings and on prices and performance of corporate bonds issued
between 2004 and 2005 to estimate the model parameters and uses those estimates to compare
the costs and benets of ratings. The resulting numerical predictions tell us that ratings costs are
low, compared to the benet of information, for the typical security. The costs are suciently low
that without the ratings mandate, issuers would cease to buy ratings and all investors would buy
ratings for themselves. Thus, the repeal of ratings mandates in Dodd-Frank will have no eect on
the amount of information available about the average security. It would simply transfer the cost
of providing the information from the asset issuers to investors.
Markets for information, and the question of whether to mandate information provision, matter
beyond just the credit-ratings industry. For instance, buying consumer goods or services with
uncertain benets is similar to investing in a risky asset. Thus our main qualitative conclusions
about the eects of information regulation carry over: mandating information provision about
goods makes the most dierence when the value of the information is neither so high that the
private market will supply it anyway nor so low that it is inconsequential. Similarly, it would
also have most eect when customers neither buy so much of this good that they would demand
information privately, nor so little of the good that the information has negligible eect on their
welfare. While nancial information helps to allocate real productive capital, consumer goods
information encourages high-value goods to be supplied and low-value goods to be withdrawn. In
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both cases, mandatory information improves allocative eciency. But this eciency gain may not
benet consumers because, in equilibrium, the price of goods with less-uncertain quality is higher.
Related literature The paper is most closely related to a recent literature on the welfare con-
sequences of information disclosure. For example, Amador and Weill (2006), Kondor (2011) and
Gorton and Ordonez (2011) also show how the release of nancial information can be welfare-
reducing. But none considers the incentives to purchase information. Goldstein, Ozdenoren, and
Yuan (2011), Albagli, Hellwig, and Tsyvinski (2009) and Angeletos, Lorenzoni, and Pavan (2010)
are similar because they model an interaction between information in nancial markets and the
real economy. But their nancial investors can manipulate real investment through their asset
purchasing decisions. This feedback creates complementarities in demand among investors and the
potential for multiple equilibria. Our model shuts down this channel by having real investment
take place rst.
Our analysis is also related to work on costly information acquisition, such as Grossman and
Stiglitz (1980), Verrecchia (1982), Peress (2010) and Fishman and Parker (2011). But it extends
this work by considering the trade-os between issuer- and investor-purchased information. If the
issuer does not provide the signal, investors themselves can choose to purchase the information
from an information market. We model the market for information in a richer way than most
of the previous literature by considering the non-rival nature of information and solving for its
endogenous market price (as in Wiederholt (2011)). This allows us to consider whether, in the
absence of ratings regulation, either issuer-provided or investor-purchased information markets will
ll in the void. Finally, the model connects nancial information choices to real investment choices,
output and welfare.
Previous models of rating agencies, while about the same institutions, have dierent tools and
objectives. Sangiorgi, Sokobin, and Spatt (2008), Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro (2007), Bolton,
Freixas, and Shapiro (2008), Damiano, Li, and Suen (2008), Harris, Opp, and Opp (2011), Becker
and Milbourn (2008) and Skreta and Veldkamp (2009) consider ratings ination and conicts of
interest in the ratings system. Manso (2011) is more similar because it examines how ratings aect
real rm performance and vice-versa. This paper abstracts from these incentive and performance
issues and instead focuses on whether even unbiased ratings should be required at all.
Finally, this work is also related to a microeconomics literature on welfare and information
disclosure (e.g. Shavell (1994), Diamond (1985) and Jovanovic (1982)). Our model diers because
it features a continuum of investors in a market that has an equilibrium price. Many of our results
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come from equilibrium eects. Furthermore, informed trade in asset markets results in a more
ecient allocation of productive capital. The fact that information creates economic value makes
our nding dierent from a Hirshleifer (1971) eect. Likewise, we contribute to the literature on
third-party certication (e.g. Lizzeri (1999)) by predicting whether a private market for certication
will arise when public mandates are not present.
1 Model
The entrepreneur and real investment An risk-neutral entrepreneur chooses k  0, how
much real capital to invest in period 1, and whether to have his asset rated (D = 1) or not (D = 0)
at a price C. If the entrepreneur has his asset rated, that rating is disclosed to all investors. The
level of investment k is the entrepreneur's private information.
In period 2, the entrepreneur auctions o his rm. Its equilibrium price is p. The entrepreneur's
expected utility is
E (pjk;D)  k   CD: (1)
The investment will produce output
y = f(k) + u
where f(k) is a concave production function, f(0) = 0 and u  N

0; 1hu

. Ratings are noisy signals
about output:  = y +  where   N(0; 1h ).
When making his rating decisions, the entrepreneur knows the function f and the distribution
of u, but does not know what the realization of u will be or what the rating  will be. Likewise,
when making his investment choice, the entrepreneur knows his rating decision D, but does not
know u or .
Investors and nancial markets There is a continuum of ex-ante identical investors with
measure Q. They have CARA expected utility with coecient of risk aversion :1
EU = E
 e W  ; (2)
1Since the model has a single asset, any risk is systematic and will be priced as such. More generally, since
corporate defaults are correlated, the default risk that credit ratings measure has a systematic component, which
justies modeling investors in any given asset as risk-averse.
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where W is their realized wealth. They have an initial endowment of wealth w0.
Investors can purchase fractional shares in the entrepreneur's project. They can also store their
initial endowment with zero net return.2 If an investor purchases a fraction q of the rm, he pays
qp for a claim to the payo qy.
The price of the risky asset p is determined in an auction. Each investor submits a bidding
function bi(q) that species the maximum amount that he is willing to pay for a fraction q of the
risky asset as a function of his information. These bid functions determine the aggregate demand.
The auctioneer species a market-clearing price p that equates aggregate demand and supply, and
each trader pays this price for each unit purchased (a Walrasian auction).3
Each investor i also chooses whether to purchase a rating (di = 1) or not (di = 0) at a price c. If
p is the market clearing price and the share of the rm investor i demands at price p is qi = b
 1
i (p),
the budget constraint is
W = w0 + qi(y   p)  dic: (3)
When making their ratings decisions, investors know the entrepreneur's rating decision D and
they have rational expectations about k and therefore can infer the equilibrium f(k). But they do
not know the output shock u or what the realized rating will be. When making their bids, investors
know the rating  if the issuer pays for the asset to be rated (D = 1) or if they themselves have
purchased the rating (di = 1). Since investors have rational expectations, when they determine the
quantity of the risky asset they demand at each price, they consider what information would be
conveyed if that were the realized price. It is as if the realized market price is in the information
set of every investor when they form their asset demand. Let this information set at the time
when investor i invests be denoted Ii, where Ii = fp; f(k)g if i has not observed a rating and
Ii = fp; f(k); g if the issuer has disclosed the rating or i has chosen to purchase it.
Asset supply noise There is a set of agents who are subject to random shocks that force them to
buy or sell the asset, at any current price. The demand of this group of agents is normally distributed
with mean zero:   N(0; 1hx ). Let x denote the net supply of the asset, after accounting for the
noise trader demand: x  1   . Thus, x  N(1; 1hx ). This noise ensures that the price investors
condition on is not perfectly informative about information that others may know.
2In a model with a gross riskless return r > 1, none of the result change qualitatively. We have also worked out
an extensive appendix that analyzes a problem where the entrepreneur can choose how many shares in his project to
issue. Both sets of results are available upon request.
3As shown by Reny and Perry (2006), this formulation of the nancial market is equivalent to proposing aWalrasian
rational-expectations equilibrium.
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Rating agencies and information markets Credit-rating agencies produce noisy, unbiased
signals about the risky asset payo y:  = y +  where   N(0; 1h ). We call these signals
\ratings."  can be discovered at a xed cost . This can be interpreted as the cost of hiring
sta to interview the rm managers, analyze nancial information, etc. The information, once
discovered, can be distributed at zero marginal cost.
Rating agencies may sell the rating service to the entrepreneur for a fee C, in which case we
assume both parties commit to publishing the result for free to all investors. Alternatively, they
can sell it to individual investors, at a price c. For the latter case, we assume that the information
is protected by intellectual property law and reselling it is forbidden.4
In either setup, we assume that the market is perfectly contestable, so that ratings agencies
make zero prots.5 This implies that, if the entrepreneur buys the rating, C = , whereas if
individual investors are the ones paying for it, and a measure  of them choose to purchase it
c =  .
That information markets are competitive is crucial. The exact market structure is not. Veld-
kamp (2006) analyzes a Cournot and a monopolistic competition market as well. All three markets
produce information prices that decrease in demand.
Order of Events
1. The ratings agency chooses a price C to charge the entrepreneur
2. The entrepreneur decides whether or not he will pay for the rating
3. The entrepreneur chooses capital investment k.
4. (a) If the entrepreneur pays for the rating, the agency nds out  and publishes it
(b) If the entrepreneur does not pay for the rating, the ratings agency decides whether to nd
out  and, if it does, chooses its price c. Investors then simultaneously decide whether
or not to buy the signal. Those who do observe .
5. Investors submit menus of prices and quantities of assets they are willing to purchase at each
price bi(q).
6. Asset auction takes place. The auctioneer sets a market-clearing price.
4This prohibition may be dicult to enforce. We analyze the consequences of this diculty in section 5.1.
5One way to ensure that the market is contestable is to force agents to choose prices in a rst stage and choose
entry in a second stage.
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7. y is realized and all payos are received.
Equilibrium An equilibrium is a rating decision D by the entrepreneur, a capital choice k(D),
investor's beliefs about that capital choice k(D) given the entrepreneur's rating decision, a rating
demand di by each investor, ratings prices for the entrepreneur and investors C and c, bidding
functions b(qjIi) for each possible information set and an asset price p(;D; fdig; ) such that:
entrepreneurs choose a rating demand D to maximize (1); taking D as given, the entrepreneur
chooses k(D) to maximize (1); investors choose di and bidding functions to maximize (2) subject
to (3); ratings agencies make zero prots, the asset market clears:
R Q
0 qidi = x and investors' belief
about investment is correct: k = k(D).
2 Solving the model
To solve the model, we start with the second-period nancial market equilibrium for given real
investment and information choices. Then we determine the outcome of information markets and
nally we solve for real investment.
2.1 Equilibrium asset prices
We begin by deriving the investors' optimal bid function for risky assets and verifying that it consti-
tutes an equilibrium. Since the asset payo y is normally distributed, expected utility (2) takes the
form EU =  e (w0+qi(E(yjIi) p) dic)+(2q2i =2)V ar(yjIi), where E(yjIi) and V ar(yjIi) are the mean
and variance of the risky asset's payo, conditional on the investor's information. This investor
maximizes EU subject to the budget constraint (3). The objective function of this constrained
maximization problem is concave in q, so that the rst-order condition describes the optimal port-
folio:
qi =
1

V ar[yjIi] 1(E[yjIi]  p): (4)
To implement this optimal portfolio, the investor submits a bidding function. Each bidder is
innitesimal, which implies that he takes the market-clearing price as given. Thus, the bidding
function b(qjIi) is the inverse demand function of a trader who seeks to maximize (2) subject to
(3), taking p as given. Note that bids depend on each investor's information set Ii, which includes
information inferred from b being the price paid per unit: bi(q) = E(yjIi)  qV ar(yjIi). Because
b(qjIi) is an inverse of (4), it is a best response given everyone else's bid function.
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The expectation and variance in (4) are conditional on an information set that includes beliefs
about the entrepreneur's capital investment k(D) and knowledge of the distribution of u. Thus,
prior to observing any signals, E[y] = f(k(D)) and V ar[y] = 1hu . The information set of investors
who have observed the rating (either because it was provided by the issuer or because they bought
it) also includes . For these informed investors, Bayes' law says that
E [yj] = f(k
(D))hu + h
hu + h
(5)
V ar [yj] = 1
hu + h
: (6)
Thus, informed traders' inverse bid function (demand) is
qI =
1

(f(k(D))hu + h   p (hu + h)) (7)
For investors who have not observed the rating, the market-clearing auction price of the risky
asset partially reveals the rating that others (if any) have observed. Since the price depends on
asset demand and demand depends on information in the price, there is a xed point problem. We
solve by guessing a linear price rule
p = +  + (   f(k(D))); (8)
and solving for the coecients ,  and . A linear transformation of the price f(k(D))+ 1 (p )
is an unbiased signal about the project output y, with variance h 1p =
1
h
+



2
1
hx
. Thus, hp is a
measure of the informativeness of prices.
The posteriors of the uninformed investors will be:
E [yjp] =
f(k(D))hu +
h
f(k(D)) + 1 (p  )
i
hp
hu + hp
(9)
V ar [yjp] = 1
hu + hp
(10)
Therefore, the menu of prices and quantities bid by each uninformed trader will be:
qU =
1


f(k(D))hu +

f(k(D)) +
1

(p  )

hp   p (hu + hp)

If a measure  of traders chooses to become informed, total demand will be qI + (Q  ) qU .
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Equating this total demand to asset supply x yields coecients for the linear price rule and conrms
the conjecture of a linear price. The following price coecients are derived in appendix A.1:
 = f(k(D))  
(hu + h) + (Q  )(hu + hp) (11)
 =

h
h + (Q  )hp
 (hu + h) + (Q  ) (hu + hp) (12)
 =
h + (Q  )hp
(hu + h) + (Q  )(hu + hp) (13)
Substituting in for  and  in the previous formula for hp tells us that price informativeness is
hp =
2h2hx
2hhx + 2
: (14)
The average price is , and it consists of the expected payo f(k(D)) less a term that accounts
for investors' risk aversion  and the amount of information they have, which depends on the
precision of the rating, the informativeness of prices and how many investors buy the rating. The
sensitivity of the price to the rating is given by .  takes values between 0 and 1, and is greater
when ratings are very precise relative to the prior and a large fraction of investors buy them. The
sensitivity of the price to noise in demand is given by . Prices will tend to be relatively sensitive to
demand noise when investors are risk averse, when few have bought the rating or when the ratings
are not very informative.
For the case where the entrepreneur provides the rating, formulas (11) - (14) still apply, setting
 = Q, while for the case where no one buys the rating, the formulas apply taking the limit as
! 0.
2.2 Investor-based information market
Suppose that the entrepreneur decides not to provide a rating for the market. Investors must
individually choose whether or not to acquire the rating at the price c. Since investors are ex-ante
identical, they will only make dierent choices when those choices yield identical expected utility.
Appendix A.2 computes the expected utility of an informed investor and the expected utility of an
uninformed investor when a measure  of the population of investors is informed. If there exists a
 2 [0; Q] that equates the two expected utilities, then this is an equilibrium. Appendix A.2 shows
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that the equilibrium measure of informed investors is
 =
p
hxh
s
h
(hu + h)(1  exp( 2c))   1 (15)
If this  is not between 0 and Q, then there is a corner solution. If expected utility for uninformed
is higher, the corner solution is  = 0, otherwise, the solution is  = Q. If the right side produces an
imaginary number, it signies that there is no positive measure of informed investors that equates
expected utility for the informed and uninformed. In these instances, the only solution is for all
investors to remain uninformed.
Equation (15) implies that demand for the rating is decreasing in the price c, decreasing in
the precision of the prior hu and increasing in the variability of noise trader demand
1
hx
, which
makes prices less informative. The eect of rating precision h is ambiguous. On the one hand,
more precise information is more valuable; on the other, it induces informed traders to take larger
positions in the asset, which makes equilibrium prices more informative as well.
Equilibrium implies that, if the issuer does not provide the rating, (15) and the zero-prot
condition
c =


(16)
must hold.
Proposition 1 (Investors do not buy low-precision ratings) If
h
hu
< exp

2
Q

  1 (17)
investors will not buy a rating
Proof in appendix A.3. Proposition 1 implies that an investor-based information market will
not exist if:
 the information content of the rating h is small relative to the precision of the prior hu, since
this makes information less valuable
 either the xed cost of information discovery  is high or the investor base Q is small (which
makes the price c that the ratings agency needs to charge high, or
 investors are very risk averse, which makes them take small positions in the asset and therefore
prot little from better information.
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Proposition 2 (Investors do not buy high-precision ratings) Investors will not buy a rating
if h is suciently high.
Proof in appendix A.4. Proposition 2 reveals a subtlety about the investor-driven information
market. If the ratings contain very precise information, informed investors will take large positions,
which makes prices highly informative. With a xed price c for the rating, this would imply that as
precision increases, only a vanishing measure of investors choose to become informed, as is the case
in the model of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980). However, because the ratings agency must cover the
xed cost , low demand means it must raise prices. For suciently high precision, there is simply
no price at which this market is viable.
Propositions 1 and 2 jointly imply that an investor-led market for ratings can only function if
the information is of some intermediate level of precision.
2.3 Real investment decision
Replacing the equilibrium price into the entrepreneur's objective function in (2) and noting that
 = f(k) + u+ , the entrepreneur solves
max
k
E [+  +  (f(k) + u+    f(k(D)))]  k
Note that, because investment is unobserved, the entrepreneur cannot aect beliefs about k(D)
through the investment decision. The reason for the entrepreneur to undertake investment is to
aect the rating and therefore to indirectly aect the selling price.
The rst order condition for investment is
f 0(k) =
1

The value of  depends on whether the entrepreneur has provided a rating and, if he has not, on
how many investors have purchased it. Since by equation (13)  < 1, investment always falls below
its rst-best level, which is dened by f 0(k) = 1. Furthermore, since  is increasing in , investment
will be higher when more investors are informed. Therefore whenever the equilibrium value of  in
an investor-driven market is less than Q, investment will be higher under issuer-provided ratings.
Note further that if the rating is not produced at all then  = 0 and therefore k = 0.
Information is socially valuable in this model because it allows entrepreneurs to appropriate part
of the marginal product of additional investment even though the investment itself is unobserved.
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Thus it promotes a level of investment that is closer to the ecient level.
2.4 Entrepreneur's rating decision
The entrepreneur will provide a rating i expected payos net of the information cost  exceed
expected payos without information. He takes into account that his decision to rate the asset will
aect his decision of how much to invest and will aect the price the asset sells for in the nancial
market. Let p1 be the price of an asset when investment k
(1) is undertaken and all investors
observe the asset's rating. Let p0 be the price of the asset when investment k
(0) is undertaken
and the investor-led ratings market determines how many investors observe the rating. Then, the
entrepreneur will rate the asset when E[p1]  k(1)   > E[p0]  k(0).
Proposition 3 (Ratings provision by entrepreneur)
1. If
f(k(1))  k(1)  f(0) + 
Q
h
hu (h + hu)
> ; (18)
then either the issuer will provide a rating or at least some investors will buy it
2. If condition (18) does not hold, the entrepreneur will not provide a rating.
Proof in appendix A.5. When the entrepreneur considers whether or not to provide a rating, the
entrepreneur takes into account both the equilibrium measure of investors that will buy the rating
if he doesn't provide it () and how his own incentives to invest will change with the information
structure. In case providing the rating results in more information (which will be the case unless
 = Q) this brings about two sources of gains. First, better information will result in closer-to-
ecient investment. By equation (11), the average price moves one for one with expected output,
so the entrepreneur appropriates the entire eciency gain f(k(1))   k(1)   [f(k(0))   k(0)].
Second, by providing investors with information, the entrepreneur reduces the risk they have to
bear, which increases average prices. The entrepreneur trades o these two sources of gains against
the cost  of the rating.
Condition (18) says that the gains from providing information outweigh the cost, assuming that
if the entrepreneur does not provide information, the investors will not buy it either. If the condition
holds, then either the entrepreneur expects a sucient number of investors to buy the rating on
their own, or will buy the rating himself. If the condition doesn't hold, then the entrepreneur
prefers not to buy the rating even if he expects investors to remain uninformed.
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Proposition 3 implies that entrepreneurs will not provide ratings if
 the precision h is too low, because the value they add (both directly through reducing risk
for investors and indirectly by providing incentives for investment) is too little
 the cost  is too high
 investors are suciently risk tolerant (low ) or numerous (high Q) that the discount from
bearing risk is small
 the precision of investors' prior is high enough that the additional information from the rating
makes little dierence
In summary, combining the results from propositions (1), (2) and (3) reveals when no ratings
will be produced. Ratings will not be produced at all if signal precision h is suciently low,
the information xed cost  is suciently high, or if prior belief precision hu is suciently high.
These are the instances where de-regulation will have the strongest eects on information provision.
Instead of all investors being informed with credit rating mandates, the market will not provide
information for anyone. These are situations that we refer to as \information market collapse."
3 Eects of De-regulation on Asset Prices
What will happen to the prices of assets after de-regulation? In order to build intuition and
focus on the pure asset-pricing eects, we consider the case where there are no eects on the real
investment decision. We hold k and  xed. The next section re-introduces the real economic
eects of information provision.
The following proposition shows that on average, the price of credit assets will fall as information
becomes less abundant.
Proposition 4 For an issuer that does not provide a rating, the average asset price is increasing
in .
Proof in appendix A.6. To see why this is true, note that ratings aect asset prices in two ways:
First, a positive signal will push the price of the asset up, while a lower-than-expected signal will
reduce the price investors are willing to pay for an asset. In expectation, signals are neutral. Thus
on average, the positive and negative eects of the signal cancel out. The second eect is that the
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rating makes the asset's payo less uncertain. In doing so, it makes the asset less risky. Lowering
risk lowers the equilibrium return and systematically raises the asset's price.
The next two results describe which assets are likely to be most aected by de-regulation. These
assets are neither the largest or smallest investor base securities, but the ones in between. Likewise,
they are neither the assets for which prior beliefs are most or least precise. To formalize these ideas,
we consider the dierence between the price of an asset with mandatory ratings and the price of
an asset without mandatory ratings, but in an environment where either the entrepreneur or the
investor can choose to purchase a rating.
Proposition 5 (De-regulation reduces the price of a medium-investor-base asset) Let
pM be the price of the asset if ratings are mandatory and pE be the price of the asset if the ratings
decision is an equilibrium outcome. Then
1. If Q is suciently low, pM = pE.
2. If Q is suciently high, E[pM ] > E[pE ].
3. limQ!1
 
E[pM ]  E[pE ] = 0.
Proof in appendix A.7. The rst part of this result says that when the size of the investor base
Q is suciently low, the entrepreneur will pay to have his own asset rated. The reason is as follows:
When the measure of investors is small, each investor must hold more of the asset for the market
to clear. If the investor is bearing lots of risk by holding lots of the asset, then reducing that risk
by giving the investor information has a large eect on the price the investor is willing to pay for
the asset. The fact that the auction price for the asset is sensitive to the amount of information
investors have means that entrepreneurs get much higher prots from selling a rated asset versus
an unrated asset. Furthermore, because the investor base is small, the per-copy price that ratings
agencies would need to charge investors would be high, making the investor-driven market nonviable
(as shown in Proposition 1). Knowing this, the entrepreneur has a strong incentive to pay for his
asset to be rated.
The second part of the result says that when the base of investors is relatively large, each
investor bears a small amont of risk and therefore the risk premium is not suciently large to
persuade the issuer to provide the ratings. Moreover, the measure of investors exceeds the number
who are willing to buy the rating, so not all investors become informed, meaning that prices are
on average lower than if all investor became informed through mandatory ratings.
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The last part of the result says that in the limit as Q ! 1, it is still the case that not all
investors are informed but this makes no dierence for average prices because, since each investor
bears almost no risk, average prices converge to expected dividends.
Proposition 6 (De-regulation reduces the price of a medium-precision asset) Let pM be
the average price of the asset if ratings are mandatory and pE be the average price of the asset if
the ratings decision is an equilibrium outcome. Suppose
q
hxh
1 exp( 2=Q)
exp( 2=Q)
> Q (19)
Then
1. If hu is suciently low, E[p
M ] = E[pE ]
2. There is an interval
 
hu; hu

such that E[pM ] > E[pE ] for all hu 2
 
hu; hu

,
3. limhu!1
 
E[pM ]  E[pE ] = 0
Proof in appendix A.8. This result considers what happens as prior beliefs become more or less
precise. When priors are very imprecise, signals are valuable to individual investors and will be
acquired by all of them, as long as they are not too numerous, which is guaranteed by condition
(19). When priors are very precise, no information will be acquired. But any information acquired
would have a tiny eect of already precise prior beliefs. Since ratings aect beliefs (mean and
variance) very little, they aect asset prices very little. In the limit as the prior precision tends to
innity, the dierence between the asset's price with mandatory ratings and without disappears.
In between these extremes, there exists a region where not all investors are informed and where
the asset price is strictly less than it would be under the mandatory ratings regime.
4 Ratings Regulation and Welfare
Ultimately, the most important question is whether government mandated information disclosure
helps or hurts economic welfare. There are a few dierent ways we might think about a policy
maker's objective in this model. We examine each in turn.
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4.1 Maximizing output
One possible objective a government might have is to simply maximize the production of real goods.
This is obviously a simplication, but it makes for a good starting point. The relevant question
becomes: Which ratings policies maximize output f(k)?
The primary friction in the model is that investors' imperfect information about capital in-
vestment decisions of the rm reduces the entrepreneur's return to investing in capital. In other
words, if investors don't know that the entrepreneur invested more, he won't be compensated for
that investment when he sells his rm. Eciency requires that the marginal return to investment
be equal to its unit marginal cost: f 0(k) = 1. Therefore if we somehow manage to ensure that
the private return to a marginal unit of investment is equal to its social return, @E(pjk)k = f
0(k),
then investment will be ecient. With imperfect information, the left side is typically smaller than
the right because prices can only respond to changes in k to the extent that investors know k.
The following analysis shows that mandatory information provision to nancial markets helps to
remedy this friction because it makes p more responsive to k.
Since the production function is concave, a higher f(k) corresponds to a lower marginal product
of capital f 0(k). The entrepreneur's rst-order condition tells him to set f 0(k) = 1=. The pricing
coecient  (equation 13) is increasing in the measure of informed investors , as long as h  hp.
Inspecting equation (14) reveals that h  hp. This makes sense because prices cannot reveal more
information that what is contained in the signals they are revealing.
If ratings are mandated by the government,  = Q, this maximizes , minimizes f 0(k) and
thus maximizes f(k) over all feasible values ( 2 [0; Q]). Thus, mandating ratings provides the
maximum possible information, which maximizes output of real economic goods. Since information
facilitates the ecient allocation of capital, mandatory information disclosure maximizes output.
4.2 Maximizing output net of costs
One obvious objection to the policy objective in the previous subsection is that it does not take
into account the cost of investment or information production. In particular, it treats information
as if it were free. More information might always be better. But if information is costly, it must be
suciently valuable to justify its cost. Thus, another possible objective is to maximize f(k) k ,
where  = 1 if any agent (entrepreneur or investor) discovers information and  = 0 otherwise.
Since prices are uninformative when no agents observe a rating (hp = 0 when  = 0), the
required f 0(k) is innite, meaning that no investment takes place when the project is not rated:
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k(0) = 0.
Next, note that since f(k)  k is maximized when  = Q, this means that if anyone incurs the
cost  to discover information, the output-maximizing outcome is for all investors to observe that
information. Any  6= f0; Qg does not maximize output net of costs. That leaves the question:
In what circumstances is the higher output associated with  = Q large enough to compensate
for the cost of information? In other words, what are the parameters of the problem for which
f(k(1))  k(1)   > 0? Substituting in k from the rst-order condition in this inequality yields
f

(f 0) 1

1 +
hu
h

  (f 0) 1

1 +
hu
h

> :
For example, if production is f(k) = k, then the high-information level of capital is k(1) =
((1 + hu=h)=)
1=( 1). This level of investment produces more output, net of investment and
information costs when k(1)((k(1))( 1)   1) > .
For a general, concave production function f , we know that f 0(k(1)) > 1, so that anything that
increases k(1) also increases f 0(k(1))   k(1) and therefore makes the inequality more likely to
hold. A higher ratio of the signal precision to prior precision (h=hu) makes k
(1) higher, making
it more likely that the high-information level of capital is the one that maximizes output net of
investment and information costs.
4.3 Maximizing a weighted sum of utilities
This is the most commonly used social welfare criterion. In this setting, the objective this produces
depends on how one weights the issuer (a single entity) versus the investors (a continuum of agents).
The question of how one models the noise traders then also comes into play. Since we have no
guidance on how to weight these various constituencies, we simply examine their utilities separately
in order to answer the question of who gains and who loses from reform.
A simple revealed preference argument establishes that the asset issuer is always weakly better
o without the ratings mandate. Without the mandate, the asset issuer can always choose to pay
for and disclose the rating. But with the mandate, he cannot choose to forgo a rating.
Thus, the question becomes: How does the ratings mandate aect investors? On the one
hand, information produces more ecient investment decisions that increase the total production
and therefore the total payos to all risky assets. On the other hand, proposition 4 tells us that
information increases the price investors must pay issuers for the asset, which makes them worse
o.
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Proposition 7 (Investors prefer information market collapse) Investors have higher ex-
ante expected utility when no information is provided ( = 0) than when ratings are mandatory
( = Q).
Proof in appendix A.9. Investors benet from access to a high-risk, high-return asset. They are
indierent between holding the last, marginal share of a risky asset, but earn a utility benet from
holding all the inframarginal shares. When ratings are issued, it is as if the asset is replaced by a
lower-risk, lower return asset. Investors earn less of a utility benet from holding this asset at the
new, higher equilibrium price.
To see why investors prefer high return and high risk, note that when information is symmetric,
ex-ante expected utility is a positive constant times
EU /   exp
 1
2
(E(yjI)  p)2
V ar(yjI)

: (20)
(See A.2 for derivation.) The fact that variance appears in the denominator of the fraction tells
us that each investor individually would prefer more information. But when all investors acquire
more information, the expected return falls. Recall (from equation 11) that expected return is
proportional to the conditional variance: E[yjI]   p = V ar(yjI). Since expected return, and
therefore variance enters squared in the numerator and only linearly in the denominator, the ratio
is increasing in variance: (E(yjI) p)2=V ar(yjI) = 2V ar(yjI). Thus, expected utility is increasing
in the conditional variance of the asset payo.6 Acquiring information is like a prisoner's dilemma.
Each investor wants to observe more information. But investors would like to collectively commit
to observe less.
Proposition (7) implies that if the choice were between mandating ratings and banning them,
investors would collectively benet from a ban. However, this does not immediately imply that they
would benet from removing the mandate. Without a mandate, each individual investor has an
incentive to acquire information and, given the resulting equilibrium, may or may not be better o
than with the mandate. In fact, investors prefer mandatory ratings when the alternative involves
asymmetric information. If issuers will not provide the rating and only some investors are willing
to buy the rating at the equilibrium information price, then there will be asymmetric information,
6In a Merton (1987)-style model with CRRA preferences, similar relationships hold: Holding all else constant,
log expected returns are proportional to variance. Conditional on observed signals, interim expected utility also
depends on (log expected return)2=variance. But ex-ante utility has an additional term that comes from wealth
eects, whose partial derivative with respect to signal precision depends on parameter values. Details and numerical
results available on request.
19
with some investors knowing  and others not. The informed and uninformed investors will hold
dierent quantities of risky and riskless assets. But since all investors are identical ex-ante, holding
dierent portfolios entails sharing risk ineciently. Inecient risk sharing reduces investor welfare.
If this welfare eect is strong enough, investors prefer that a mandatory ratings statute restore
information symmetry. The next result characterizes this information asymmetry region where
mandatory ratings are preferable using threshold values of the information xed cost .
Proposition 8 (Investors prefer mandatory ratings when information is cheap.) There
exists a cuto  such that for  < , investor welfare with mandatory ratings is higher than with
investor-purchased ratings.
Proof in appendix A.9. This result is surprising because one might think that it is when
information is very expensive that investors would prefer for asset issuers to pay for it and provide
it to them for free. Instead, when information is expensive, investors know that few among them
will buy ratings, so there will be few informed investors to drive up asset prices and excess returns
will be available. Instead, when information is cheap, most investors will buy it. This leaves the
individual investor with the alternative of either paying for the rating or trading with a large pool
of better-informed investors. In this scenario, they will prefer that ratings be provided for free.
Noise traders' welfare Finally, there is the issue of how (whether) to include noise traders
in the welfare calculation. One possible interpretation of noise traders is that they are merely a
modeling convenience to capture the idea of imperfection in the information aggregation process
and thus one can safely ignore them in the welfare calculation. Another is to assume that noise
traders are either trading for liquidity reasons or are making mistakes. Their welfare is still aected
by the prots or losses they make from trading in this market. The aggregate prots they make
are given by
 = (y   p)
and, using (8), expected prots are given by
E =   
hx
(21)
where , given by equation (12), is the sensitivity of the asset price to noise trader demand. Noise
traders are hurt by the fact that when they trade they move the price against themselves.
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Proposition 9 (Noise traders benet from mandates) The prots of noise traders are max-
imized when ratings are mandatory ( = Q).
Proof in Appendix A.10. When all investors are informed, the asset is less risky for them, which
makes their demand more elastic and thus more able to absorb noise with little change in price.
Furthermore, the fact that investors are informed means they don't infer anything from prices, so
noise traders do not adversely aect investors estimates of the value of the asset. For this reason,
noise traders are always better o when  = Q, which the mandate brings about.
5 A Quantitative Evaluation of Welfare
The theory can provide a set of parameter values for which investors prefer ratings mandates and
set of parameters for which the investors prefer their repeal. So ultimately, the question of whether
ratings enhance investor welfare or not is a quantitative one. This section proposes some rough
estimates for the model parameters and then uses those estimates to predict welfare outcomes once
the repeal of mandatory ratings, required by the Dodd-Frank Act, is implemented.
Data description We select parameters to match features of corporate bonds. Our data comes
from Datastream and includes all corporate bonds issued in 2004 and 2005, with maturities of not
more than 30 years, whose prices are tracked by Datastream. In total, this amounts to 770 dierent
bonds. The bond ratings are the Standard and Poor's rating, prior to issuance.
For each bond, we know the price at the time when it was issued and the rating at the time of
issue. It is this initial rating that we compare to the model rating . We also know the promised
annual coupon (interest) payments on the bond, its face value and its market price 1 year later.7
In our sample, the average coupon rate (annual interest promised) is 5.7%.
To make the data comparable to the objects in the model, we make two transformations. First,
we adjust prices for uctuations in the risk-free rate. The problem is that if a bond is issued in 2004
and then in 2005 the risk-free interest rises, the 2005 price of the bond will fall for reasons that are
outside our model. Second, the contractual terms (e.g. the coupon rate) dier across bonds. To
adjust for this, we construct a variable yp that is the present value of all the promised payments {
coupons plus face value at redemption. Then, we normalize the issue price ~p and the bond payo
7Ideally, one would follow each bond all they way up to maturity or default but data limitations prevented this.
Thus, our measure of the output from the asset is the value an investor would have realized by selling the bond one
year after issue, when at least some uncertainty has been realized. As a robustness check, we re-did the analysis using
the bond's market price 2 years later and found very little dierence in the result.
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~y by yp so that p = ~p=yp and y = ~y=yp. These normalized prices and payos are what we compare
to p and y in the model. The details of these transformations are laid out in appendix B.
Parameter selection In order to estimate parameters we assume that the data has been gener-
ated by the model under the current regime of issuer-provided ratings, which implies  = Q. We set
the values of the ve key model parameters to match ve moments of the data whose dependence
on the parameters is fairly straightforward.
We do this in a slightly extended version of the model where, in addition to the rating, all
investors observe a public signal w = y +  where   N(0; h 1w ). Details of this extension are in
Appendix C. The extension makes no dierence for the theoretical results above since this public
signal enters the model in exactly the same way as the prior. However, this extension allows the
model to better t the data since the public signal, though unobserved to the econometrician, is
allowed to be dierent for each bond in the sample and get incorporated into prices. This allows the
model to account for the fact that prices, even though they have noise, are slightly more informative
about bond payos than are ratings.
The appendix derives the following ve moments that are functions of the parameters: hu, hw,
h, hx and =Q:
1. The unconditional variance of bond payos. It pins down the parameter hu.
V ar (y) =
1
hu
(22)
2. Informativeness of the rating. This is the R2 of a regression of bond payos y on ratings .
Given that the rst moment pinned down hu, this one determines the noise in ratings h.
R2yj =
1
1 + huh
(23)
Since ratings are discrete, when we estimate this R2, we use a dummy variable for each
possible rating.
3. Average returns. The average bond return is particularly sensitive to, and therefore particu-
larly informative about risk aversion and the measure of investors =Q.
E [y   p] = 
Q (hu + hw + h)
(24)
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This measure of return is an absolute amount, not a percentage return, as typically computed
in the data. To convert this absolute return into an average percentage return, simply divide
by the average (nomalized) bond price, which is 0:914.
4. Informativeness of the price. This is the R2 of a regression of bond payos y on bond prices p.
It is sensitive to the amount of public information hw and how much noise the noise trading
introduces hx.
R2yjp =
1

(h+hw)Q
2
hu
hx
+ 1 + huh+hw
(25)
If hw is very high, then this R
2 approaches 1. Instead if hw = 0, this R
2 = [


hQ
2
hu
hx
+ 1+
hu
h
] 1, which means the informativeness of prices is necessarily lower than the informativeness
of ratings. In the data, prices are slightly more informative than ratings, which means that w
must contain at least some information. In other words, investors know more than just \this
is a bond," even before they observe any bond ratings.
Similarly, if noise trader demand is very predictable (high hx) then prices reveal most of the
information in ratings and public signals. This makes the R2 high. If noise trading is very
volatile, then prices will reect more noise and less information. The eect of noise trading
also depends on risk aversion and signal precision. If investors have low risk aversion or very
precise information, then noise traders have less eect on prices.
5. Price variance. The unconditional variance of the bond price also reects how much noise
trading causes the price to vary and how much public information moves price around.
V ar (p) =

1
hu + hw + h
2 " 
Q
2 1
hx
+
(h + hw)
2
hu
+ h + hw
#
(26)
Notice that  and Q always enter as a ratio, implying that they are not separately identied in the
model when  = Q.
The one other parameter we need to calibrate is the xed cost of information discovery. In the
model, when issuers provide ratings, this is equal to the price that ratings agencies charge issuers.
Treacy and Carey (2000) report that the average cost of rating an asset is 0:0325% of the value of
the issue, so we set the  equal to 0:0325% times the average price of 0:91. Table 1 summarizes
our parameter estimates.
Note that ratings are about as informative as prior beliefs. But public information is more
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Table 1: Parameter values for numerical results.
parameter value target

Q 12:4 average returns
hu 142 bond payo variance
hw 266 informativeness of prices
h 128 informativeness of ratings
hx 0:330 price variance
 0:00029 Treacy and Carey (2000)
informative than either. The variance of noise trader demand is quite high (low hx) to account for
the relatively high variance of prices conditional on ratings, which the model interprets as resulting
from noise.
Numerical results Given these parameters values, the optimal strategy for an asset issuer is
not to pay to rate the asset. The reason is that the issuer knows that all investors will buy the
rating anyway. Thus, with or without mandatory ratings, all investors are informed. The repeal
of the ratings mandate simply transfers the amount of the ratings fee c from investors to issuers.
These ndings suggest that Dodd-Frank ratings provisions benet asset issuers, at the expense of
investors. But they also tell us that the reform is not likely to adversely aect market information
or liquidity.
To see why all investors would choose to purchase the rating, consider the indierence condition
for the marginal investor who decides whether or not to buy the rating. It tells us that the investor
will buy the rating as long as the utility benet (left-hand side) exceeds the utility cost (right hand
side): s
V ar (ujp)
V ar (uj)   1 > exp (c)  1 (27)
Consider the case where all investors buy the rating and examine the incentive of the last innites-
imal investor to buy the rating as well. Given our estimated parameters, which imply hp = 27:58,
the conditional variances of payos ares
V ar (ujp)
V ar (uj) =
s
hu + hw + h
hu + hw + hp
=
r
536
435:58
= 1:109:
If all investors buy the signal, the ratings agencies charge each investor c = =Q. Thus, exp(c)
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= exp(=Q) = exp(12:4  :00029) = 1:004. Subtracting one and comparing these terms, we nd
that the utility benet of the rating is 0:109, while the utility cost is 0:004. This means that, even
when the value of information is at its lowest, when all other investors also have the information,
the value of that information exceeds its cost by more than a factor of 25.
5.1 Copyright and Information Leakage
A maintained assumption in the model is that, unlike partial revelation through prices, direct
leakage of information, for instance by investors who bought the rating sharing it with those who
have not, can be eectively prevented by intellectual property laws. However, this might be hard
to enforce due to technologies that make it easy to disseminate information. If information leakage
cannot be prevented, rating agencies might not be able to sell enough copies of the information
at a high enough price to pay for the xed cost of information discovery. This would render the
investor-pay market inviable through a far more direct channel than the model examines.
The degree to which information leakage is an insurmountable concern is a matter of debate.
Ratings agencies did mainly follow an investor-pay model until around the mid-twentieth century,
and historical accounts dier on the relative roles played by regulation and technological progress
(in particular, photocopying machines) in driving the shift towards an inssuer-pay market (White,
2010). Ratings agencies could try to take measures to prevent easy retransmission of information,
such as delivering their reports in non-recorded oral communications, but whether these attempts
would be successful remains an open question.
If anything, if the threat of information leakage undermines the investor pay market, this would
strengthen the welfare implications of the model. Asset issuers would still prefer deregulation
because then they can choose to provide the rating or not. Investors' preference for deregulation
would now be unambiguous because if it leads to any change at all, it is to the disappearance of
ratings, which investors strictly prefer, and never to asymmetric information.
6 Conclusions
The paper investigated the likely consequences of repealing ratings mandates. It characterizes the
types of assets for which a free market for information will provide ratings to investors. Information
could be purchased by an entrepreneur who wants to provide the information to investors to make
his project less risky and therefore more valuable to them so that it can fetch a higher price at
auction. Alternatively, it could be purchased by investors who want to know how much of the risky
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asset to buy.
When the private market provides information to most investors, repealing the ratings mandate
will have little eect on most assets' prices or on welfare. But in some instances, that private market
does not provide information. In these cases, entrepreneurs are always better o without the ratings
mandate. Surprisingly, investors are often better o without the mandate as well. Investors' welfare
is maximized when no information about the asset payo is available to anyone.
There are obvious limitations to interpreting these welfare results. This model included only a
couple of potential benets of ratings: facilitating the allocation of productive capital and prevent-
ing the inecient risk-sharing that comes with asymmetrically informed investors. These benets
must be weighed against the cost of information discovery and the loss of investors surplus when
an asset becomes less risky. There are other possible benets of ratings, such as the ability to
limit risk-taking by banks or portfolio managers or the ability to eectively summarize the average
credit quality of large pools of assets. There are also other possible problems with credit ratings
such as ratings ination, the possibility that ratings crowd out some richer more nuanced sources
of information, or outright investor deception. None of these are incorporated in the model. Yet,
the ability of ratings to ameliorate asymmetric information problems and to improve the eciency
of asset prices are certainly two of the most widely-acknowledged benets of ratings. And some
of the weaknesses of the ratings system might be addressed by reforms that are less drastic than
eliminating the ratings requirement system altogether. Thus, the conclusions provide some insight
by weighing some of the most important advantages and disadvantages of credit ratings.
The results could also be re-interpreted more broadly in the context of a consumer goods mar-
ket. We typically assume that when a seller provides customers with more complete information,
eciency improves and customers benet. Just like nancial asset prices direct the allocation of
real capital, goods prices inuence the quantities of goods that are produced. Mandatory informa-
tion disclosure encourages high-value goods to be supplied and low-value goods to be withdrawn.
But, when the supplier has some monopoly power, this eciency gain may not ultimately benet
consumers because the equilibrium price of goods with better and less-uncertain quality is higher.
Services that rate products, like Consumer Reports, benet the buyers that obtain their infor-
mation, but may harm the other buyers who are left with a market for lemons. The resulting
ineciency in the allocation of goods could be severe enough that buyers prefer sellers to always
disclose information. In a partial equilibrium model with xed prices, this argument for mandatory
provision of information is straightforward. But in an equilibrium model, consumers could also
benet from repealing information regulations.
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A Mathematical Appendix
A.1 Solving for the nancial market equilibrium
This appendix solves for the equilibrium price in the risky asset market. It veries the conjecture of the existence of
a price that is linear in signals and asset supply and it derives the formulas for the linear weights.
Beginning with the market clearing condition qI + (Q  ) qU = x we use the formulas for qI and qU and to
solve for p:
Qf(k(D))hu + [h   p(hu + h)] + (Q  )
h
f(k(D)) +
p  


hp   p(hu + hp)
i
= x
Qf(k(D))hu + (Q  )
h
f(k(D))  

i
hp + h   p
h
(hu + h) + (Q  )(hu + hp)  (Q  )hp

i
= x
p =
Qf(k(D))hu + (Q  )
h
f(k(D)))  

i
hp + h   x
(hu + h) + (Q  )(hu + hp)  (Q  )hp
(28)
which has a linear form as conjectured. Equating coecients:
 =
f(k(D))[(hu + h) + (Q  )(hu + hp)]  (Q  ) ahp   
(hu + h) + (Q  )(hu + hp)  (Q  )hp
(29)
 =

 (hu + h) + (Q  ) (hu + hp)  (Q  ) hp
 =
h
 (hu + h) + (Q  ) (hu + hp)  (Q  ) hp
Computing price informativeness yields
hp =
1
1
h
+



2
1
hx
: (30)
Substituting in expressions for  and  yields (14) and replacing hp in (29) yields (11)-(13).
A.2 Solving for the equilibrium measure of informed investors
Recall the utility function:
V =  E [exp f Wg]
where
Wi = (w0   cd) + qi [y   p]
where c is the price of the rating and d = 1 if the investor bought it and zero otherwise.
Because of the CARA-Normal structure, given an information set for investor i, utility is
Vi =   exp
n
 
h
Ei

W Ii

  
2
V ari

W Ii
io
(31)
Use that qi =
E[yjIi] p
V ar[yjIi] so that
W Ii = w0   cd+ E [yjIi]  p
V ar [yjIi] [y   p]
Denote Ei(y)  E [yjIi] and V ari(y)  V ar [yjIi] and conclude that
Ei

W Ii

= (w0   cd) + [Ei (y)  p]
2
V ari (y)
(32)
and
V ari

W Ii

=
[Ei (y)  p]2
2V ari (y)
(33)
Replacing (32) and (33) in (31):
Vi =   exp (  (w0   cd)) exp

 1
2
[Ei (y)  p]2
V ari (y)

(34)
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Utility of the informed investor The information set of an informed investor includes  and p. Let
I  V ar [EI (y)  p] (35)
ZI  EI (y)  pp
I
(36)
Replacing (35) and (36) into (34):
VI =   exp (  (w0   c)) exp

  I
2V arI (y)
Z2I

(37)
Conditional on p, ZI follows a Normal distribution with mean AI =
E(yjp) pp
I
and standard deviation 1. Using
that, by the law of total variance
V ar (yjp) = I + V arI (y)
and the MGF of a noncentral 2 distribution to take conditional expectations of (37), we conclude that
E [VI jp] =   exp (  (w0   c))
s
V arI (y)
V ar (yjp) exp

  (E (yjp)  p)
2
2V ar (yjp) :

(38)
Utility of the uninformed investor Equation (34) directly implies
E [VU jp] =   exp ( w0) exp

  (E (yjp)  p)
2
2V ar (yjp)

(39)
Utility comparison From (38) and (39) and noting that V arI(y) = V ar(yj; p) = V ar(yj):
E [VI jp]  E [VU jp] =
"
exp (c)
s
V ar (yj)
V ar (yjp)   1
#
E [VU jp]
Taking expectations over p, ex-ante indierence requires:
exp (c)
s
V ar (yj)
V ar (yjp) = 1 (40)
Using
V ar(yj) = 1
hu + h
(41)
V ar(yjp) = 1
hu + hp
(42)
and equation (14) to solve for  yields equation (15).
A.3 Proof of proposition 1
From (15), a positive solution for  requires
h
(hu + h)(1  exp( 2c))   1 > 0 (43)
which reduces to
h exp ( 2c)  hu (1  exp ( 2c)) > 0 (44)
Since the ratings agency must make nonnegative prots and at most a measure Q of investors purchase the rating,
this means that c  
Q
. Therefore (44) cannot hold if (17) holds.
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A.4 Proof of proposition 2
Rewrite (15) as
 =
p
hhx
vuut h+huh exp ( 2c)  huh
h+hu
h
(1  exp ( 2c)) (45)
Fixing c, (45) implies limh!1  = 0. Letting c =


does not alter this conclusion because  is decreasing in c.
Therefore, with an endogenous information price, the right side approaches zero even faster.
Even though  = 0 in the limit, it could still be that for any nite h,  > 0. The following shows that this is
not the case.
Suppose not. This means that for every h (45) has a solution  2 (0; Q] with c =  . Rearrange (45) and use
c = 

:
p
h =
1

p
hx
vuuut

1 + hu
h

exp
  2

  hu
h
1 + hu
h
  
1  exp   2

 :
Since the previous expression holds for every h, by continuity it should also hold in the limit as h ! 1. On the
LHS we have that limh!1
p
h =1. On the RHS, we have that:
lim
h!1
1

p
hx
s
exp
  2

 
1  exp   2

 = p
hx
lim
!0
s
1
2 exp
 
2

  1
where the right hand side considers  a function of h (limh!1 (h) = 0). Finally, L'Hopital's rule tells us that
lim!02 exp
 
2


=1, and therefore (46) is zero in the limit.
Therefore, we have two sequences that must be equal for all nite values but are dierent in the limit. Since
these two sequences come from continuous functions, this is a contradiction.
A.5 Proof of proposition 3
1. Suppose to the contrary that the issuer does not provide information, and investors do not buy it either.
Expected prots for the issuer will be:
0 = f(k(0))  
Qhu
  k(0)
If instead the issuer paid for a rating, expected prots would be:
i = f(k(1))  
Q(h + hu)
  k(1)  
Rearranging the inequality I   0 > 0 and using the result that k(0) = 0 yields condition (18). If the
condition holds, it contradicts the assumption that the issuer does not provide information.
2. If condition (18) does not hold, then 1  0, so an issuer will not provide a rating even if he expects investors
not to buy it either. By Proposition 4 below, this implies that the issuer will not provide a rating regardless
of what he expects investors to do.
A.6 Proof of proposition 4
From equation (11), using the fact that we have abstracted from the real investment decision:
@
@
=
h   hp + (Q  ) @hp@
(Qhu + h + (Q  )hp)2
 > 0
because
@hp
@
> 0 and h > hp.
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A.7 Proof of proposition 5
1. For any given set of other parameters, there is a Q suciently low such that (18) holds. From proposition 3,
this implies that either the issuer will provide a rating or some investors will buy it. But from proposition 1,
for Q suciently low, no investors will buy a rating. Therefore, 9 ~Q such that for all Q < ~Q, (18) and (17)
both hold. For any such Q, the issuer will provide the rating. If the issuer chooses to provides the rating, the
information sets of all agents and therefore the asset prices are the same as if the issuer were required to buy
the rating. Therefore pM = pE , for every realization of  or x.
2. Having abstracted from the choice of k, the must exist a cuto Q1 such that for any Q > Q1, condition (18)
fails so the issuer will not provide the rating.  will then be given by the minimum of Q or the solution to
equations (15)-(16). Therefore there exists a cuto Q = maxfQ1; g such than whenever Q > Q, Q > .
Using (11), this implies E[pE ] < E[pM ].
3. Note that E[p] =  and, from equation (11), limQ!1  = f(k) no matter what is the value of . Since we
have xed k, the result follows.
A.8 Proof of proposition 6
1. Condition (19) implies that for suciently low hu, the solution to equations (15)-(16) is greater than Q, which
implies that all investors would buy the rating (anticipating this, the entrepreneur does not provide it), so
pE = pM .
2. Let hu be the maximum value of hu such that  = Q. This value must exist since  = Q for hu small enough
and, from equation (15),  = 0 for hu large enough. Let 
1 be the issuer's expected prots if he provides a
rating and 0 be his prots if he does not. It follows that 1   0 =   for hu < hu. Furthermore, because
both 1 and 0 are continuous in hu and  is continuous in hu at hu, 
1 0 is continuous in hu at hu. This
implies there is a hu > husuch that if hu 2
 
hu; hu

, the issuer prefers not to provide a rating even though
 < Q. Using (11), this implies E[pE ] < E[pM ].
3. This follows because as hu !1, p! f(k(D)) no matter whether there is a rating or not.
A.9 Welfare of investors - proof of propositions 7 and 8
Expected utility conditional on an information set is given by (34). Let
Ai  E [Ei (y)  p]
i  V ar [Ei (y)  p]
Zi  Ei (y)  pp
i
Ex-ante, Zi  N

Aip
i
; 1

.
Rewrite (34) as
Vi =   exp ( (w0   cd)) exp

 1
2
1
V ari (y)
iZ
2
i

Using the formula for the moment-generating function of a chi-square distribution, the ex-ante expected utility is
E(Vi) =   exp ( (w0   cd))
exp

  1
2
Ai
2 1
V ari(y)
1+ 1
V ari(y)
i

q
1 + 1
V ari(y)
i
or, re-normalizing:
Wi   2 log
  E(Vi)
exp ( w0)

=
Ai
2
V ari (y) + i
+ log (V ari (y) + i)  log (V ari (y))  2cd (46)
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1. In case the issuer supplies the rating, then, using (11) - (14):
EI (y)  p = x
Q (hu + h)
V arI (y) =
1
hu + h
Therefore
I =


Q (hu + h)
2
1
hx
(47)
AI =
1
Q

hu + h
(48)
2. In case the issuer does not supply the rating and  2 (0; Q), there are two expected utilities to consider, that
of the informed agent and that of the uninformed. But in an interior equilibrium, the two must be equal. So,
it suces to look only at the expected utility of the uninformed agent. Using (11) - (14):
EU (y)  p = AU +BU (1  x) + CU (   f (k(D)))
V arU (y) =
1
hu + hp
where
AU =  =

h
h + (Q  )hp
 (hu + h) + (Q  ) (hu + hp) (49)
BU =

hp
hu + hp
  



=

hp
hu + hp
  h + (Q  )hp
 (hu + h) + (Q  ) (hu + hp)


h
CU =

hp
hu + hp
  

=

hp
hu + hp
  h + (Q  )hp
 (hu + h) + (Q  ) (hu + hp)

so
U  BU 2 1
hx
+ CU
2

1
h
+
1
hu

=
"

h
2
1
hx
+

1
hu
+
1
h
#
hp
hu + hp
  h + (Q  )hp
 (hu + h) + (Q  ) (hu + hp)
2
(50)
3. In case the issuer does not supply the rating but in equilibrium  = 0, utility can be found by setting h = 0
in (47) and (48):
0 =


Qhu
2
1
hx
(51)
A0 =
1
Q

hu
(52)
4. Finally, for the case where the issuer does not provide a rating but in equilibrium  = Q, utility for each is as
in the issuer-provided rating, subtracting the xed cost c = 
Q
, so that
WQ =WI   2 
Q
Replacing (51) , (52), (47) and (48) respectively into (46)
W0  WI = 2hx
h 1
Q2huhx + 2
  1
Q2(hu + h)hx + 2
i
+ log
0B@ 1 + 1hu


Q
2
1
hx
1 + 1
hu+h


Q
2
1
hx
1CA > 0
that is positive because h > 0. This proves Proposition 7.
Now we prove Proposition 8. First, from (49) and (48), it follows that lim!QAU = AI . Second, we use (50),
(47) and (14) to establish the following two claims.
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Claim 1 1)
U
I
=
h hp
hu+hp
hu
h
and 2) I   U = hph
hu+h
hu+hp
I
Proof. Let U  lim!Q U =


Qh
2
1
hx
+

1
hu
+ 1
h
 h
hp
hu+hp
  h
hu+h
i2
. Then
U
I
=


Qh
2
1
hx
+

1
hu
+ 1
h
 h
hp
hu+hp
  h
hu+h
i2
h

Q(hu+h)
i2
1
hx
= [2hu +Q
2h2hx +Q
2hhxhu]| {z }
(hu+hp)(2+Q2hhx)
(h   hp)2| {z }
4h2

(2+Q2hhx)
2
hu
1
2h2(hu + hp)
2
=
2hu
(2 +Q2hhx)(hu + hp)
=
h   hp
hu + hp
hu
h
and
I   U =
h
1  h   hp
hu + hp
hu
h
i
I
=
hp
h
hu + h
hu + hp
I
Claim 2 lim!Q
h
1
hu+hp
+U
i
= 1
hu+h
+I
Proof. Observe that lim!Q hp =
Q2h2hx
2+Q2hhx
. Then:
lim
!Q
h 1
hu + hp
+U
i
=
1
hu + h
+I ,
lim
!Q
1
hu + hp
  1
hu + h
= I   U , (By Claim 1)
lim
!Q
h   hp
(hu + hp)(hu + h)
=
hp
h
hu + h
hu + hp
I ,
lim
!Q
hp
h
h 
Q(hu + h)
i2
=
hp
h
I ,h 
Q(hu + h)
i2
= I
Now we establish the result:
WI   lim
!Q
WU =
 
Q(hu + h)
2h 1
1
hu+h
+I
  11
hu+hp
+U
i
+ log
 1
hu+h
+I
1
hu+hp
+U

+ log
hu + h
hu + hp

By Claim 2, the rst two terms are equal to zero, and since h > hp, we have that:
WI   lim
!Q
WU = log

hu + h
hu + hp

> 0
Therefore, for  suciently close to Q, WI > WU . Proposition 8 then follows from the fact that for a suciently
small , the equilibrium value of  will be Q.
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A.10 Proof of proposition 9
Equation (12) and the fact that hp < h imply that  is minimized when  = Q. The result then follows from
equation (21).
B Data
Adjusting for uctuations in the risk-free rate. We compute the spread as follows: By denition,
the yield of the bond at the issue date, rb0 satises
p0 =
TX
t=0
ct 
1 + rb0
t
where ct is the bond's t-dated coupon (or coupon-plus-principal). The spread on the bond is
s0 = r0   rT0
(where rT0 is the T -maturity risk-free rate as of t = 0). At t = 1, instead of looking directly at the price of the bond,
we look at a corrected price dened by
~p1 =
TX
t=0
ct
(1 + rT0 + s1)
t
where s1 is the spread calculated on the basis of the t = 1 price. If r
T
0 = r
T
1 , the corrected price coincides with the
pure price, but if risk-free interest rates have changed in the meantime, the corrected price lters out the eect.
Normalizing by the promised value. In order to account for the dierent contractual terms of dierent
bonds, we normalize the price of bonds by the contractually-promised net present value yp, dened by
yp =
TX
t=0
ct
(1 + rT0 )
t
For bonds with low probability of default (for instance, highly rated bonds), their price as a proportion of the
contractually promised net present value (p=yp) will be close to one. In our data, the average p=yp is 0:91.
C Model with Public Signal
Suppose there was a public signal w that everyone could see in addition to the rating.
w = y +  with   N

0;
1
hw

:
The equilibrium price will have the form:
p = +  +  (   f) +  (w   f)
Solving for the coecients:
 = f   
 (hu + hw + h) + (Q  ) (hu + hw + hp)
 =

h
h + (Q  )hp
 (hu + hw + h) + (Q  ) (hu + hw + hp) (53)
 =
h + (Q  )hp
 (hu + hw + h) + (Q  ) (hu + hw + hp)
 =
hw
 (hu + hw + h) + (Q  ) (hu + hw + hp)
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Assuming that the data comes from the model with publicly observable ratings ( = Q), this reduces to
 = f   
Q (hu + hw + h)
 =

Q (hu + hw + h)
 =
h
hu + hw + h
 =
hw
hu + hw + h
Deriving ve moments Next, we derive each of the ve moments that we match to data.
1. Unconditional variance of bond payo. This is the variance of output, which is, by assumption,
V ar (y) =
1
hu
: (54)
2. Price variance. The variance of the price can be computed using the equilibrium price equation
p = +  +  (   f) +  (w   f)
= +  + ( + )u+  + 
V ar (p) = 2
1
hx
+ ( + )2
1
hu
+ 2
1
h
+ 2
1
hw
=

1
hu + hw + h
2 "

Q
2
1
hx
+
(h + hw)
2
hu
+ h + hw
#
(55)
3. Average excess return. The excess return in the model is
y   p = y         (   f)   (w   f)
= f + u        (u+ )   (u+ )
so
y   p = u+ 
Q (hu + hw + h)
  
Q
1
hu + hw + h
   h
hu + hw + h
(u+ )  hw
hu + hw + h
(u+ )
=

Q (hu + hw + h)
  
Q
1
hu + hw + h
   h
hu + hw + h
   hw
hu + hw + h
 +
hu
hu + hw + h
u
and therefore the average excess return is
E [y   p] = 
Q (hu + hw + h)
(56)
4. Informativeness of prices. The standard formula for the R2 in a regression of y on p is
R2 =
Cov (y; p)2
V ar (y)V ar (p)
We can compute this covariance by rewriting price p as a function of the unexpected component of the bond
payo u:
p = +  +  (   f) +  (w   f)
= +  + ( + )u+  + :
Since y = f(k) + u and f(k) is a known constant,
Cov (y; p) = ( + )
1
hu
:
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Using this covariance formula and the formulae for the unconditional variances (54) and (55),
R2 =
( + )2

1
hu
2
1
hu

1
hu+hw+h
2 

Q
2
1
hx
+ (h+hw)
2
hu
+ h + hw

=
1

(h+hw)Q
2
hu
hx
+ 1 + hu
h+hw
(57)
5. Informativeness of ratings. The standard formula for the R2 in a regression of y on  is
R2 =
Cov (; y)2
V ar (y)V ar ()
=
V ar (y)2
V ar (y) [V ar (y) + V ar ()]
=
1
1 + hu
h
(58)
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